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Decisions taken by the manager of a bank are subject to the regulatory discipline of the Basel 
Committee in conjunction with the supervisory discipline of the Board of Directors, a body 
that represents shareholders. This research demonstrates that the two types of discipline act in 
complement to each other, whereas the extant literature shows that regulatory discipline is 
replacing the internal discipline exercised by the Board of Directors. We also show that these 
internal and external governance mechanisms are relevant to explain the simultaneous 
influences between financial performance, risk-taking and the capitalization of French banks 
from 1998 to 2004.  
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21 – INTRODUCTION 
 
In February 2006, the Basel Committee stressed the need to strengthen good 
governance practices in banks. The Committee recommended that managerial discipline roles 
should be shared between the board of directors and the controlling authorities. The board of 
directors, to consist of a larger number of independent directors, should be responsible for 
approving the bank’s strategies and values, ensuring respect of the hierarchy and transparency 
of management, and motivating and supervising management, with particular focus on its 
audit role as part of a coherent overall approach. In complement, the controlling authorities 
should be responsible for issuing the guidelines needed to ensure banks meet one of the 
Committee’s major objectives: depositor protection. The primary role of the authorities was to 
be the “supervisor of supervision”. They were mainly in charge of developing board and 
management empowerment, together with verification of good governance practices and 
control of audit. It is clear from the “Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision" 
report published by the Basel Committee in 2006 that the internal control exercised by the 
board of directors and the external control exercised by the controlling authorities 
complement each other.  
This article belongs to the literature on corporate governance, in the more specific 
framework of governance of banks. The Basel Committee’s report stresses the relevance and 
importance of using a combination of internal and external discipline over decisions made by 
the bank’s manager, in order to maximize value creation. The objective is to compare this 
theoretical and now regulatory framework of governance with the reality of French banking 
practices. To do so, we shall compare the discipline exercised by Basel Committee 
regulations under the 1988 Accord (since amended) with the internal discipline exercised by 
the board of directors.  
The major contribution of this research lies in its focus on the two apparently 
contradictory pressures faced by the manager:  
-  Regulations, designed to protect depositors and avoid systemic risk, force the 
bank to limit risk-taking by imposing a minimum capitalization requirement, 
-  The board of directors, as a shareholder representative body, seeks to 
maximize shareholder value even when greater risk-taking will be involved. 
What are the relative influences of board discipline and regulatory demands in respect 
of the manager’s triple objective of maintaining a required capitalization level, taking risks 
and achieving good performances?  
 
3To answer this question, we examine the French banking sector from 1998 to 2004. 
We seek to understand the concurring trends in French banks’ capitalization, risk level and 
performance, based on internal governance and regulatory variables. We show that the two 
governance mechanisms complement each other, although the literature examining the 
question in the banking sector finds that regulatory discipline is replacing internal board 
discipline. 
This article is structured as follows. First, we propose a review of the extant literature 
on governance of banks (section 2), which forms a basis for our proposed model of the issues 
(section 3), before reporting the results of our study on a French sample (section 4). 
 
2 – CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OF BANKS: A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
 
Examination of past research on the corporate governance of banks reveals its 
specificities compared to corporate governance of business organizations in general. The 
importance of regulation
1, the complexity of agency problems
2 and the low capitalization rate 
in the banking sector are the key factors that make governance of banks substantially different 
from governance of industrial firms (Ciancanelli and Gonzalez, 2000). For better 
understanding of this specificity, we present the role of banks’ boards of directors before 
comparing them with the external mechanism of regulations. Finally, we focus on the special 
link between governance and risk-taking for banks.  
2.1. The board of directors, an internal managerial discipline mechanism  
The Board of Directors is the primary mechanism of the internal control system, 
serving to discipline and set game rules with the manager. Jensen (1993) presents the factors 
required to enable the board of directors to act as an effective control mechanism, including: 
-  Free access to relevant information for board members.  
-  Ownership by the manager and board members of a significant number of shares in the 
firm, in order to ensure a certain alignment of interests with shareholders.  
-  A limited number of directors (seven or eight) to foster efficiency, but enough to 
                     
1   Bank governance is unusual due to the sector’s high degree of regulation (Ciancanelli and Gonzalez, 
2000; Llewellyn, 2001; Booth et al., 2002; Macey and O’Hara, 2003 and Berger and Bonaccorsi di Patti, 2003), 
intended to limit bank bankruptcies by curbing systemic risk (Llewellyn 2001, Basel Committee 1988 and 2004). 
2   Agency problems are more complex, particularly with regard to information asymmetry that affects 
not only the shareholder-manager relationship, but also: 
    The relationship between depositors, the bank and the regulating authorities 
    The relationship between shareholders, the manager and the regulating authorities 
    The relationship between borrowers, the manager and the regulating authorities. 
 
4prevent the board being controlled by the manager. In respect of banks, Booth et al. 
(2002) and Adams and Mehran (2003 and 2005) find that banks’ boards of directors 
are larger in size (with 16 members on average). Contrary to Jensen’s explanations, 
Adams and Mehran (2005) find no negative association between board size and 
performance, suggesting that restrictions on board size in the banking sector may be 
counterproductive.  
-  Similarly, the manager should be the only internal member of the board, because the 
presence of any other internal members could help the manager to influence the board.  
-  The functions of manager and the chairman of the board of directors should not be 
held by the same person. 
2.2. Combination of internal and regulatory mechanisms 
Corporate governance of banks is characterized by internal mechanisms designed to 
influence and monitor the manager's behaviour, but also by external mechanisms such as 
regulation, which are extremely important in this sector. 
In his work on takeovers in the banking sector, Prowse (1995) looks at the disciplinary 
mechanisms applicable to managers of banks. He compares the banking sector with other 
sectors of industry, and highlights that banks’ boards of directors are weak effective 
managerial discipline mechanisms compared with the threat of a hostile takeover as an 
external mechanism. Observing that manager turnover in banks is twice as low as in other 
firms, he explains this by reference to the structure of the board. Banks’ boards of directors 
are mostly made up of internal directors who reinforce the manager's observed entrenchment. 
The low rate of external directors is explained by low ownership of shares in the bank, 
providing little incentive to discipline the manager effectively. Prowse also shows that 
intervention by the regulatory authorities increases with the bank’s size and the degree of 
performance deterioration.  
These results were confirmed by Booth et al. (2002), who study the possibility of 
limiting conflicts of interest between the manager and the shareholders. They look at four 
mechanisms for managerial discipline: one external mechanism, regulation, and three internal 
mechanisms: board member independence, share ownership by the manager and separation of 
the functions of manager and chairman of the board. Booth et al. explain that one of these 
four mechanisms may be more important in managing divergent interests in a shareholder 
approach. In highly regulated sectors like the banking sector, the discipline exercised by 
regulation is replacing banks’ internal governance mechanisms and therefore limiting his 
 
5latitude for action. The importance of regulatory discipline is explained by its major role in 
developing a durably sound, stable banking sector, particularly through Basel Committee 
capital adequacy regulations, and the regulation of deposit insurance. This major role 
interferes directly with the shareholder-management relationship.  
In a similar vein, Bouwman (2004) examines the interaction between three bank 
governance mechanisms: capital requirements, regulatory supervision and supervision by the 
dominant shareholders, and the impact of these three mechanisms on risk-taking and 
performance after an acquisition. Capitalization requirements and regulatory supervision are 
substitutable mechanisms in monitoring banks’ acquisition behaviour, which is shown to 
subsequently affect risk-taking and the performance of the acquisition. Shareholder 
supervision then replaces supervision by the regulatory authorities when it is ineffective, and 
vice versa. 
2.3. Bank governance and risk-taking  
The study of corporate governance throws special light on the performance of banks. 
Saunders et al. (1990) propose an explanation of the effects of capital regulation on risk-
taking by banks. They hypothesize that shareholder-controlled banks
3 have a greater incentive 
to take risks than manager-controlled banks
4. They validate the hypotheses that banks 
controlled by shareholders are riskier than banks controlled by the manager, and add that this 
difference in risk-taking is more significant in periods of deregulation (particularly between 
1979 and 1982). This shows that the existence of regulations can limit and reduce incentives 
to take greater risks. Saunders et al. recommend stricter monitoring by the authorities for 
shareholder-controlled banks, in order to contain their risk-taking. 
Demsetz et al. (1997) analyse the links between agency costs specific to the banking 
sector and risk-taking by banks. They argue that when there are conflicts of interest between 
shareholders and the manager, the latter’s risk aversion offsets the excessive risk-taking 
associated with using loopholes in the deposit insurance system, leading to the emergence of a 
moral hazard. They observe a strong association between ownership structure and risk-taking 
when the bank’s franchise
5 value is low. A low franchise value is associated with excessive 
                     
3   Situation in which the manager is also a significant shareholder and seeks to maximise shareholder 
returns. 
4   Situation in which ownership is diffuse and the portion of shares held by the manager is not significant, 
potentially giving him latitude to act in his own interests, to the detriment of shareholders. 
5   The franchise value is defined as the potential profit generated by the firm, and can reduce risk-taking. 
Keeley (1990) explains the decline since the 1970s in US bank franchise values by the rise in the probability of 
default caused by use of risky assets and reduction of capitalization. This excessive risk in banks' risk-taking is 
 
6risk-taking due to the moral hazard problem and exacerbated conflicts of interest between 
shareholders and manager. Demsetz et al. show that managerial share ownership (implying 
that the manager’s interests will be aligned with those of shareholders) influences risk-taking 
via significant use of risky assets, whereas concentrated ownership, particularly in the hands 
of external shareholders, influences risk-taking more through financial levers. This confirms 
the findings of Keeley (1990) and shows that external shareholders exercise more pronounced 
control over the manager's risk-taking decisions, more through influencing financial structure 
than by active management of risky assets. 
The work of Demsetz et al. supports the results reported by Gorton and Rosen (1995), 
who propose an explanation for the rise in risks in the 1980s that led several banks to 
collapse. They show that agency problems related to the limited control exercised by 
shareholders offer a more relevant explanation for the rise in risks than the moral hazard 
generated by the deposit insurance system. Shareholders do not directly participate in 
development of the bank’s asset portfolio, which is the manager's job, and only have 
imperfect control over the decisions of the manager, who will be inclined to greater risk-
taking when the banking sector is in difficulty. This behaviour is explained by the 
entrenchment of the manager who holds a share in the bank large enough to circumvent the 
discipline exercised by shareholders, but not large enough to align his interests with 
shareholders' interests.  
Jeitchko and Jeung (2005) show that the importance of the risk preferences of the 
bank's key actors determines the bank's level of risk. They show that shareholders have more 
incentive to be less risk-averse in the banking sector, due to the benefits that can be drawn 
from the deposit insurance system (Merton, 1977). However, the authorities which guarantee 
the deposits seek to limit the funds allocated to insurance of deposits representing a major 
illiquidity risk for the bank being assisted, and are in favour of a "conservative policy" for 
risk-taking, i.e. are more risk-averse than the shareholders. The same is true of the bank's 
manager, who is considered more risk-averse than shareholders because he has a personal 
interest in ensuring durability of business for his organization (thus confirming Saunders et 
al., 1990).  
 
                                                                
explained by exploitation of the deposit insurance system, which accentuates the moral hazard engendered by the 
depositor protection programme. However, this excessive risk-taking is mitigated by the regulatory costs of 
bankruptcy, which can be predicted based on potential losses in terms of franchise value in the event of 
bankruptcy. A similar result is observed by Gonzales (2005), who shows that regulatory restrictions, particularly 
for deposit insurance, lead banks to take more risks and therefore to weaken their franchise value. 
 
73  –  MODELLING OF THE CAPITAL ADEQUACY RATIO AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OF 
BANKS 
Research into corporate governance shows that shareholders are less markedly risk-
averse than the manager, because they are able to diversify their share portfolio while the 
manager is more personally implicated. If higher returns are expected, shareholders may 
accept risk-taking above the level "tolerated" by the regulations for a given capitalization 
level. This relationship is reminiscent of the work of Kahane (1977), Koehn and Santomero 
(1980) and Rochet (1992) who demonstrate the ineffectiveness of regulations to force banks 
not to invest in the riskiest assets. This positive relationship between risk level and 
capitalization is analysed differently from the agency theory angle by Saunders et al. (1990), 
who show that the manager of a bank with a highly risky asset portfolio offsets those risks by 
lower financial leverage, i.e. raising the level of equity, and vice versa.  
This positive relationship has also been highlighted in the empirical literature 
analysing the impact of capital regulation on risk-taking by banks. A study by Shrieves and 
Dahl (1992) laid the foundations for most subsequent empirical research. It proposes a model 
of the relationship between the level of equity and the level of risk that advances 
understanding of this relationship’s simultaneous nature. A positive, simultaneous 
relationship is found between changes in the level of risk and changes in the bank’s 
capitalization. This result shows that regulation is effective in influencing decisions 
concerning the bank’s capitalization and risk-taking. Regulatory constraints can limit risk-
taking by banks, as proved by Ediz et al. (1998) for British banks, Aggarwal and Jacques 
(2001) for US banks, Rime (2001) for Swiss banks, Murinde and Yaseen (2004) for African 
and Middle Eastern banks, and Godlewski (2005) for banks in emerging countries. These 
papers show that the regulating authorities exercise significant discipline over bank 
capitalization.  
A large number of other studies, also heirs of the model proposed by Shrieves and 
Dahl (1992), come to a slightly different conclusion, supporting a negative relationship 
between the capitalization and risk levels in banks. Jacques and Nigro (1997) for US banks, 
Van Roy (2003) for banks in G10 countries and Heid et al. (2004) for German banks arrive at 
this conclusion, explaining that capital regulation increases the Cooke ratio and reduces the 
portfolio risk for the banks studied
6. 
                     
6   All these authors conclude that capital regulation is effective, particularly the 1988 Basel Committee 
regulations. However, the difference between the sign of the relationship depends on the indicator used to 





Drawing on this research, we can postulate that the pressure exercised by regulations 
intended to limit risk-taking is inversely proportional to the pressure from shareholders whose 
objective is to maximise their returns. Starting from these two contradictory pressures on the 
manager's decisions regarding the content of the bank's asset portfolio, our model seeks to 
capture the effects of these pressures on the bank's performance. 
As performance is assessed through the risk-return tradeoff, we consider it relevant to 
select three endogenous variables for our model:  
- Performance, measured by the change in return on equity.  
- Capitalization, measured by the capital adequacy ratio: equity over total assets.  
- The bank's risk-taking, measured by the following ratio: risk-weighted assets (the 
denominator of the Cooke ratio) over total assets. 
These two measures of capitalization and risk-taking were applied in the work by 
Shrieves and Dahl (1992), Rime (2001), Heid et al. (2004) and Murinde and Yaseen (2004).  
 
Table 1: Summary of simultaneous influences identified by the literature 





Change in risk level 
and performance 
Shrieves and Dahl (1992)  +  Not tested  Not tested 
Jacques and Nigro (1997)  -  Not tested  Not tested 
Rime (2001)   + but non-significant  + (ROA)  Not tested 
Aggarwal and Jacques 
(2001) 
+  Not tested  Not tested 
Van Roy (2003)  -  + (ROA)  Not tested 
Heid, Porath and Stolz 
(2004) 
+ but non-significant  + (ROA)  Not tested 
Murinde and Yaseen (2004)  -  + (ROA)  Not tested 




The explanatory variables for our model are external discipline and internal discipline 
variables, and variables assessing the degree of managerial latitude.  
The first variables are those that capture regulatory discipline: 
-  REG1 is an explanatory variable reflecting the difference between the bank's 
                                                                
assets as the capital ratio, whereas research finding a negative relationship uses the Cooke ratio. 
 
9capital adequacy ratio and the minimum level required by regulations, i.e. 8%. 
This variable measures the scale of the bank’s "safety cushion". 
-  REG2 is a variable measuring the speed at which the bank adjusts its capital 
adequacy ratio to regulatory standards. It is the product of the distance from the 
8% minimum requirement (REG1) and the bank's capital adequacy ratio at the start 
of the period (CAPt-1). 
 
The variables capturing the control mechanisms implemented by the board of 
directors to discipline managerial decisions are derived from the work of Jensen (1993) 
under the agency theory, and most research on corporate governance of banks: 
-  TAILLE (size) is the number of directors on the board of directors (BD).  
-  INDEP is the proportion of independent directors on the BD
7.  
-  PDG
8 is the proportion of managers from other firms who are members of the 
bank's BD. This variable measures the effectiveness of board supervision, as a 
certain number of directors have the same decision-making functions in other 
firms, which means peer discipline is possible as explained by Jensen and Fama 
(1983).  
 
The last variables concern manager characteristics which indicate a certain 
managerial latitude: 
-  AGE refers to the manager's age. This variable draws on the managerial 
entrenchment theory, as studied by Shleifer and Vishny (1989), suggesting that a 
manager close to retirement can deliberately make his services essential to his 
firm, such that replacing him can be extremely costly for shareholders. 
-  MANPDG indicates the number of CEO positions held by the manager, which 
reflects his managerial latitude in decision-making functions. Holding many CEO 
positions may indicate that a manager has a certain latitude to act in his own 
interests rather than the interests of shareholders. 
 
                     
7   According to the definition given in the Medef-Afep report of July 1999: "A director is independent of 
the corporation's management when he or she has no relationship of any kind whatsoever with the corporation or 
its group that is such as to jeopardize exercise of his or her free judgement." Angbazo and Narayanan (1997) 
consider directors who are not, and have never been, employed by the bank as independent directors. 
8    In French, PDG stands for "Président-Directeur Général", equivalent to (Chairman and) Chief 
Executive Officer. 
 
1Using these variables, the model's three equations are developed:  
  The performance change equation  
ΔROEj,t = a0 + a1 ΔCAPj,t + a2 ΔRISKj,t + a3 INDEPj,t + a4 TAILLEj,t + a5 PDGj,t + a6 AGEj,t + 
a7 MANPDGj,t + a8 REG2 - α1 ROEj,t-1 + ωj,t 
 
  The capitalization change equation 
ΔCAPj,t = b0 + b1 ΔROEj,t + b2 ΔRISKj,t + b3 INDEPj,t + b4 TAILLEj,t + b5 PDGj,t + b6 AGEj,t 
+ b7 REG2j,t - β1 CAPj,t-1 + εj,t 
 
  The risk level change equation 
ΔRISKj,t = c0 + c1 ΔROEj,t + c2 ΔCAPj,t + c3 INDEPj,t + c4 TAILLEj,t + c5 PDGj,t + c6 AGEj,t + 
c7 MANPDGj,t + c8 REG1j,t - ϕ1 RISKj,t-1 + υj,t 
 
4 – ANALYSES OF THE FRENCH BANKING SECTOR 
After presenting our model, we proceed to empirical validation using data from the 
French banking sector. After a presentation of the validation protocol, a brief descriptive 
study of our sample is proposed, followed by the simultaneous estimation of our model.  
4.1. Description of the data and methodology 
This study covers the eighteen major French banks from 1998 up to 2004, the year the 
Basel Committee adopted the McDonough reform.  
  The data comes from a database constructed from the banks' annual reports, 
complemented by the Dafsa database of directors and the "Guide des états-majors" (a French 
directory of the management of the country’s top firms) for the years covered by our study. 
The simultaneous estimation was carried out based on the three-stage least squares method 
(3SLS)
9.  
4.2. Descriptive study of French banks from 1998 to 2004 
It is visible from the factual data for both European banks (Bouaiss, 2008) and French 
banks that the Cooke ratio for these banks is higher than the minimum 8% required by the 
                     
9   The three stage least squares (3SLS) method appears the most appropriate to estimate the system of 
simultaneous equations, as shown by the specification test applied through a Hausman test in the version 
developed by Spencer and Berk (1981). This method has also been used in the work of Jacques and Nigro 
(1997), Rime (2001), Aggarwal and Jacques (2001), Van Roy (2003), Murinde and Yassen (2004) and 
Godlewski (2004). 
 
1regulations. Given that most banks comply with the Cooke ratio, the question arises of the 
scale of their safety cushion. The average ratio is over 13% from 1996 onwards. This level 
can be explained for European banks by the influence of market discipline, which encourages 
banks to maintain an economic level of capitalization that is probably more in line with bank's 
actual risk-taking than the regulatory capital requirements.    
The descriptive analysis (diagram 1) of changes in French banks' Cooke ratio shows 
first and foremost that the average ratio for the whole sample (and for each subset
10) is 
markedly higher than the regulatory 8% over the study period. The average annual capital 





































Diagram 1: Changes in the Cooke ratio of French banks, 1998 to 
2004 
 
Adams and Mehran (2003) find that banks' BDs consist of 18 members on average, 
against 12 for other types of firm. Booth et al. (2002) also report an average of 16 members, 
and in our own study of French banks (table 1), we observe an average of 16 members over 
the period 1998-2004. Adams and Mehran explain this high average by reference to the size 
of banks, which is much larger in terms of total asset volume, particularly due to the 
complexity of the bank’s organization: they are often made up of subsidiaries with their own 
BDs, each one potentially represented on the parent company's BD. In France, this type of 
structure essentially concerns the large mutual groups, in which regional banks have their own 
BDs and the general managers of the regional banks are members of the head office's BD.  
Table 2: Descriptive analysis of governance variables 
                     
10   Our overall sample is broken down into three subsamples: 
-    Banks with a shareholder-type ownership structure, which we call commercial banks, 
-    Banks with an cooperative-type ownership structure, which we call mutual banks, 
-    Banks of a commercial nature, but which are subsidiaries of mutual banks. 
 
1Variables 2004 2003 2002 2001 2000  1999  1998
Average Board size (number of directors) 
-  Commercial banks 
-  Mutual banks 
-  Subsidiaries of mutual banks 































Average % of independent directors 
-  Commercial banks 
-  Mutual banks 
-  Subsidiaries of mutual banks 































Average % of directors who are CEO of other firms
-  Commercial banks 
-  Mutual banks 
-  Subsidiaries of mutual banks 































Average age of manager  
-  Commercial banks 
-  Mutual banks 
-  Subsidiaries of mutual banks 































Average number of CEO positions held 
-  Commercial banks 
-  Mutual banks 
-  Subsidiaries of mutual banks 































*: information not available 
 
Adams and Mehran also note that the BD has more independent (external) directors, 
indicating a greater degree of independence than in other types of firm (68.7% compared to 
the average 60.6%) and more pronounced control by these independent directors. For our 
French sample, we observe that the average number of independent directors over the period 
is approximately 20%, indicating that France is a case apart. We also note a clear difference 
between the average number of independent directors in mutual banks' BDs compared to 
other banks' BDs. This relatively small number (6 members on average) is explained by the 
very nature of mutual banks (the parent companies), whose purpose is to "coordinate" the 
activities of each of the regional banks in the group. The parent company BDs are often made 
up of the General Managers of the regional banks, and therefore have fewer directors from 
outside the group. 
 
1The final variable capturing the control exercised by the BD is the average percentage 
of directors who are managers of other firms. This variable is a proxy for the control 
exercised by peers, i.e. individuals exercising similar management functions in other 
organizations. Across the whole sample, approximately 45% of board members are also 
managers, underlining the large potential for control by this type of director. There are more 
manager-directors in mutual banks, consistent with the arguments on the importance of 
independent directors, who compensate for the "deficit" of control by independent directors 
by providing a higher level of peer control. 
On the variables capturing managerial latitude, we see that the average age of 
managers in the large French banks is approximately 56, noting that managers of mutual 
banks are older (average age 58). There are very sharp differences in the number of CEO 
positions held by managers of banks. On average, for the whole sample, we note that 
managers of French banks hold some 2.6 CEO positions, with a considerable difference for 
managers of mutual banks, who hold an average of more than 4, while managers of their 
subsidiaries hold slightly under 2. 
4.3. Econometric analysis 
  In continuation of the descriptive study, we propose an analysis of two systems of 
equations (tables 2 and 3): we decided first to focus solely on external governance variables, 
then to include internal variables related to the discipline exercised by the board. The results 
of the two estimations are analysed in two stages: first, we examine the influences between 
the model's three endogenous variables: performance, capitalization and risk level; we then 
put forward some explanations for these three endogenous variables, drawing on internal and 
external governance variables. 
4.3.1. Simultaneity of influences between the model's endogenous variables 
  Simultaneous effects between the model's three endogenous variables are visible in 
tables 2 and 3. These results are present in both regressions, highlighting the interaction 
between banks' financial performance, their capitalization and their risk-taking behaviour.  
 
Table 3: Results of the simultaneous estimation using regulatory variables  
ROE: change in performance (net income/book equity), ΔCAP: change in capitalization (equity/total assets), 
ΔRISK: change in risk level (risk: risk-weighted assets/total assets), ROE{1}: previous year's ROE, CAP{1}: 
previous year's equity, RISK{1}: previous year's risk level, REG1: bank's capital adequacy ratio – 8%, REG2: 




Variable explained = ΔROE 
Capitalization equation 
Variable explained = ΔCAP 
Risk equation 
Variable explained = ΔRISK 
Usable observations: 81 
BKW test: 9,01 
Adjusted R
2 = 0.4685 
BKW test: 8,31 
Adjusted R
2 = 0.5757 
BKW test: 7,34 
Adjusted R
2 = 0.4247 














































*, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1%. 
 
 
Examination of each equation shows that banks' performances improve due to the 
regulatory balance sheet constraints. A simultaneous increase in their capitalization together 
with a decline in the level of risk-taking leads to improvement in performance. For French 
banks, the Basel Committee requirements related to the Cooke ratio have a positive influence 
on return on equity. 
 
 
1Table 4: Results of the simultaneous estimation using internal and external governance 
variables 
ROE: change in performance (net income/book equity), ΔCAP: change in capitalization (equity/total assets), 
ΔRISK: change in risk level (risk: risk-weighted assets/total assets), ROE{1}: previous year’s ROE, CAP{1}: 
previous year's equity, RISK{1}: previous year's risk level, REG1: bank's capital adequacy ratio – 8%, REG2: 
speed at which the bank adjusts its capital adequacy ratio to regulatory requirements (REG1* CAPt-1), TAILLE: 
number of directors on the board, INDEP: % of independent directors on the board, PDG: % of managers of 
other firms who are members of the BD, AGE: age of manager, MANPDG: number of CEO positions held by 
the bank's manager. 
 
Performance equation 
Variable explained = ΔROE 
Capitalization equation  Risk equation 
Variable explained = ΔCAP  Variable explained = ΔRISK 
Usable observations: 71 
BKW test: 17,37 
Adjusted R
2 = 0.6607 
BKW test: 13,45 
Adjusted R
2 = 0.6894 
BKW test: 12,47 
Adjusted R
2 = 0.5133 



























































































*, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1%. 
 
The improvement in performance also leads banks to invest more in the financial 
markets. These market activities, which are risky by nature, necessitate higher capitalization 
(required by the regulations but also by shareholders, who demand higher returns for higher 
investments, even if this involves a certain degree of risk-taking).  Our results show that 
higher performance leads to a higher level of capitalization, which is also influenced by 
greater risk-taking. This finding confirms the double pressure exercised by regulations and 
shareholders. From the regulatory standpoint, an increase in risk-taking requires a rise in the 
regulatory capital. From the shareholders' standpoint, when combined with an improvement in 
performance, an increase in risk-taking by the bank, particularly in market activities leads to 
higher capitalization. This simultaneous positive influence between capitalization and risk-
taking by banks confirms the work of Shrieves and Dahl (1992), Ediz et al. (1998), Aggarwal 
and Jacques (2001), Rime (2001) and Godlewski (2005).  
The results of the risk level equation show that after an increase in capitalization, 
French banks make investments in riskier activities (market or off balance sheet operations). 
 
1This result argues in favour of shareholder discipline: to meet the demands for returns 
emanating from the providers of capital, i.e. shareholders, a bank obliged to have a higher 
capital adequacy ratio will increase risk-taking. Furthermore, in this last equation, we confirm 
the mutual negative influence between risk-taking and performance in banks. An increase in 
risk-taking leads to a decline in performance, and conversely, a decline in performance leads 
to an increase in risk-taking. In the second case, the explanation may lie in the fact that a 
decline in performance may lead to riskier behaviour by banks in order to satisfy shareholder 
demands. This greater risk-taking, however, is associated with a parallel rise in capitalization 
in order to meet the regulatory requirements.  
4.3.2. Explanation of the three variables explained by internal and external governance 
mechanisms 
 
Simultaneous estimation of the model shows very clearly that the internal governance 
variables are relevant to explain the change in performance, the change in capitalization and 
risk-taking for French banks. External governance variables show that neither the safety 
cushion held by French banks (REG1), nor the speed at which they adjust their capital 
adequacy ratio
11 (REG2) explain the three endogenous variables.  
Internal governance by the BD is essentially reflected in control by independent 
directors. Control by independents has a positive influence on French banks' performance, 
because it encourages management in the interests of shareholders. This improvement in 
performance is accompanied by greater risk-taking (the positive influence of INDEP on 
ΔRISK) and a reduction in capitalization (negative influence of INDEP on ΔCAP). The risk-
return tradeoff is managed with the objective of meeting shareholder expectations, through 
control by independent directors. Similarly, control by peers (directors who manage other 
firms) within the BD has a positive influence on French banks' performance (confirming 
Fama and Jensen, 1983) and reinforces the control exercised by independent directors.  
Contrary to the findings of Adams and Mehran (2005), the size of French banks' 
boards of directors negatively influences performance. Since the BDs in our sample have 
more than 16 members on average, this result shows that these BDs may suffer from a certain 
lack of effectiveness which then affects performance, as Jensen (1993) explains. 
These results show the relevance of the control exercised by the board of directors as 
                     
11   This result is explained by the fact that the banks in our sample have a capital adequacy ratio of more 
than 8%. 
 
1an internal governance body (contradicting the work of Prowse, 1995). However, this control 
may be limited due to managerial latitude, which our results show to be a factor in improving 
banks' performance. The manager's age and number of CEO positions held have a positive 
influence on performance. The older a manager is, and consequently the more specific and 
unique experience he has acquired, the more effectively he is able to manage the bank, 
bringing about improvements in performance.  
The positive influence on performance of the number of CEO positions held by the 
manager shows that the more firms the manager is in charge of, the more his latitude for 
action allows him to take decisions that improve performance. In the light of our results 
regarding the impact of this variable on capitalization and risk-taking, we see that this type of 
manager ultimately behaves like the shareholders. By "diversifying their portfolio of managed 
firms", he takes decisions that improve performance while also increasing the bank's risk-
taking and reducing its capitalization. The latitude for action leads the manager to act in the 
interests of shareholders. These results are in line with the work of Gorton and Rosen (1995), 
but qualify the findings of Saunders et al. (1990), Demsetz et al (1997) and Jeitchko and 
Jeung (2005), who base their work on the hypothesis that managers are more markedly risk-
averse than shareholders and have a lower propensity to risk-taking.  
 
Table 5: Summary of the assumptions in the model and results of estimations 
Endogenous variable  Exogenous variable  Expected sign  Result of estimation 
- +  ∆ of risk  
+ +  ∆ of performance 
Regulatory discipline  +  Non-significant 
-  Internal BD discpline  -  (INDEP) 
∆ of capital  
+ -  (MANPDG)  Managerial latitude 
- +  ∆ of capital  
- -  ∆ of performance 
Regulatory discipline  -  Non-significant 
+  Internal BD discpline  +  (INDEP) 
∆ of risk  
- +  (MANPDG)  Managerial latitude 
- -  ∆ of risk  
+ +  ∆ of capital  
Regulatory discipline  +  Non-significant 
-  Internal BD discipline  -  (TAILLE) 
∆ of performance 
(Regulatory approach) 
+ +  (AGE,  MANPDG)  Managerial latitude 
+ -  ∆ of risk  
- +  ∆ of capital  
Regulatory discipline  -  Non-significant 
+  Internal BD discpline  + (INDEP, PDG) 
∆ of performance 
(Shareholder approach) 





  The aim of this study is to propose an explanation for change in performance, 
capitalization and risk-taking in French banks based on internal and external governance 
mechanisms. We show simultaneous influences between the three endogenous variables in 
our model, thus confirming the literature deriving from the empirical study by Shrieves and 
Dahl (1992). We show that the regulatory discipline is exercised effectively on French banks: 
improvement of capitalization and a decline in risk-taking help to improve the performance of 
these banks. Similarly, a reciprocal increase in performance and risk-taking explains the rise 
in capitalization, and the increase in performance and decline in capitalization explain the 
decline in risk-taking by these banks. These results indicate that the regulatory discipline 
imposed by the Basel Committee has an effective influence on French banks.  
This regulatory discipline also acts in complement to the discipline exercised by 
shareholders. Supervision by the board of directors through the presence of independent 
directors and director-managers who are also managers of other firms disciplines the 
manager, resulting in an improvement of performance by effective management of the risk-
return tradeoff. Also, experience and the number of CEO positions held by the manager, 
which reflect his managerial latitude, show that the manager manages his bank in the interests 
of shareholders, investing in risky activities (as reflected in the trend in recent years’ banking 
activities towards market and off-balance sheet operations), while respecting the external 
governance constraints imposed by the Basel Committee.    
In the light of recent events in the French banking sector and the practices of Basel II 
or the French Banking Regulation Committee (CRBF) regulation 97-02 on internal control, 
the current banking crisis that has brought bankruptcy to many pillars of international finance, 
for example Lehman Brothers, raises doubts over the effectiveness of this complementary 
discipline by shareholders and the regulatory authorities. Reinforcement of regulatory 
pressure through Basel II has not in fact avoided the damaging effects of excessive risk-
taking, as in practice it prevents market discipline or regulatory discipline from operating 
effectively. Future research should focus on providing some explanation for these phenomena 
of excessive risk-taking.  
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